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The tradition of Nyāya philosophy centers on a dispassionate quest for truth which is 
simultaneously connected to soteriological and epistemic aims. In this paper, I show how 
Vācaspati Miśra brings together the soteriological concept of dispassion (vītarāga) with the 
discourse practices of debate (kathā), as a response to Buddhist criticisms in Dharmakīrti’s 
Vādanyāya. He defends the Nyāyasūtra’s stated position that fallacious reasoning is a 
legitimate means for a debate, under certain circumstances. Dharmakīrti argues that such 
reasoning is rationally ineffective and indicates unvirtuous qualities. For Vācaspati, fallacies 
are a way to prevent the spread of morally weighty falsehoods when no other method is 
available to a debater. After showing textual relationships between Vācaspati’s defense and 
Dharmakīrti’s earlier criticism, I evaluate their arguments, concluding that Vācaspati’s 
position involves irresolvable tensions with other Nyāya commitments. 
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Introduction 
The Nyāyasūtra explains its focus on technical topics in its very first sūtra. From 
understanding the true nature of concepts like epistemic instruments (pramāṇa), hypothetical 
reasoning (tarka), and discussion (vāda) one can obtain the highest good 
(niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ).1 Thus, from the very beginning, epistemology and debate practices 
are bound up with a clearly ethical and soteriological concern: ending the recurrence of lives 
riddled with pain and immorality (NS 1.1.2). Yet the Nyāyasūtra itself allows faulty 
reasoning as a defense of the truth in certain circumstances (NS 4.2.50). This exception is 
puzzling given the stated view that knowing truth through rational means leads to liberation 
and the denigration of argumentative practices aimed at self-aggrandizement or financial 
gain. In addition to being a sticking point that generations of Nyāya commentators would 
face, this problem remains in general form even today: is it ever acceptable, and if so when, 
to respond to putatively morally odious arguments with sophistry? 
Buddhist philosophers such as Dharmakīrti (circa seventh century CE) answered that it 
was never permissible, and that Naiyāyikas who made such allowances were demonstrating 
both epistemic and moral failings. In the late ninth to early tenth century, the Nyāya 
philosopher Vācaspati Miśra, in his defense of these debate practices, explicitly interconnects 
methods of argumentation with ethical virtues. His solution to the puzzle is to explicitly 
delimit the conditions under which fallacious means would be justified, and to show that, in 
fact, these means indicate a debater’s virtuous concern for the truth. While he does not name 
Dharmakīrti as an interlocutor, I argue that he is a likely target, based on argument form and 
textual allusions. 
 
1 Acknowledgments redacted for peer review. All references to Nyāyasūtra (NS) in 
Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā (NVTṬ). NS 1.1.1. in NVṬṬ, 1.12-13. 
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Recently, Nicholson (2010) has explored Vācaspati’s role as a systematizer of early 
Nyāya thought about debate which culminates a shift in conceptions of debate: debate for the 
truth (vāda) is fundamental and other models are deviations. On Nicholson’s analysis, the 
legitimation of debate for early Nyāya comes to be grounded in epistemic instruments, rather 
than purely by its agonistic defense of Vedic claims, despite the latter role being historically 
prior (93-94). In contrast to Nicholson’s diachronic analysis of debate from the 
Carakasaṃhitā to Vācaspati, in this paper, I take up a synchronic approach, focusing on 
Vācaspati’s philosophical views. I show how he brings together the soteriological concept of 
dispassion (vītarāga) with the discourse practices of debate (kathā) as a reply to 
Dharmakīrti’s criticism in the Vādanyāya (Norms of Debate), which targets Nyāya 
allowances for equivocations (chala) and futile rejoinders (jāti). Consistent with Nicholson’s 
hypothesis, we see how Nyāya integrates reasoning with soteriology: “early Nyāya 
considered philosophical argumentation legitimate so long as it was grounded in the objects 
of valid cognition (prameya)” (94). However, this relationship with argumentation must be 
nuanced, since, for Vācaspati, even fallacious debate strategies may be legitimate tools when 
used dispassionately and insofar as they defend society from moral collapse. 
 While in this essay, I will focus on Vācaspati Miśra’s contribution to Nyāya philosophy, 
his Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā (Gloss on the Purport of the Extensive Commentary on Nyāya, 
NVTṬ, he is known for his contributions to a range of philosophical textual traditions.2 The 
general point that Vācaspati engages with Dharmakīrti is already accepted. Muroya (2017) 
has recently shown in detail how Vācaspati references Dharmakīrti (and potentially 
Vāgīśvara’s Nyāyasūtratātparyadīpikā, NSTD) over the point of defeat (nigrahasthāna) 
known as “inability to reiterate” (ananubhāṣaṇa). Chinchore (1982: 287-293) takes up 
 
2 For recent discussion of his dates, see Muroya (2016). 
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Vācaspati’s arguments against Dharmakīrti at a general level, focusing on the points of 
defeat. And Solomon (1976) has discussed Dharmakīrti’s Norms, also noting that Vācaspati 
cites and engages with it (e.g. 249, 414). However, the philosophical substance of their 
disagreement deserves critical investigation on its own merits. 
 At issue is not merely an abstract question about the structure of reasoning, but the 
question of what our argumentative norms should be in the face of potential moral calamity. 
Both Dharmakīrti and Vācaspati eschew coming to blows as a legitimate strategy. And, 
though they differ over what constitutes genuine moral threats to society—for Vācaspati, not 
Dharmakīrti, skepticism about the Vedas would be such a threat—both are concerned with 
the role of discourse in human virtue. 
The Debate over Debate 
It’s common knowledge that the Nyāyasūtra itself distinguishes three kinds of debate, or 
discourse (kathā): discussion (vāda), disputation (jalpa), and wrangling (vitaṇḍā), and that 
early commentators make pains to distinguish clearly among these categories.3 Discussion is 
the paradigmatically rational form of debate, prized by Nyāya philosophers for its truth-
conducive nature: 
Discussion (vāda) is taking up a standpoint and a contrary standpoint, a taking up 
whose supporting (sādhana) and criticizing (upālambha) is by epistemic instruments 
and hypothetical reasoning, which does not contradict settled claims, and which is 
obtained by the five members [of inference] (NS 1.2.1).4 
 
3 Important literature on this topic includes (Solomon 1976) and (Matilal 1998). See Phillips 
(2017) for discussion of fallacies and defeaters in early Nyāya. 
4 pramāṇatarkasādhanopālambhaḥ siddhāntāviruddhaḥ pañcāvayavopapannaḥ 
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Disputation and wrangling are defined in the sūtra text in contradistinction to discussion. 
Disputation (NS 1.2.2) shares the same characteristics, but the support for the standpoint 
involves strategies such as equivocations (chala), futile rejoinders (jāti), and points of defeat 
(nigrahasthāna). Equivocation, defined at NS 1.2.10-17, is a misconstrual of an opponent’s 
meaning, such as taking them as speaking literally when they are speaking figuratively.  
Futile rejoinders (NS 5.1.1-37) are replies which miss the mark in some way, such as 
objections which rely on false equivalence. Finally, points of defeat (NS 5.2.1-23) are 
dialectical moves which, when identified, force the user’s loss, such as subtly changing the 
proposition under discussion in one’s reply. In what follows, I will characterize all of these as 
“fallacies,” which I understand as “speech acts which hinder in any way the resolution of a 
dispute in a critical discussion,” following van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2015). This 
broadens the notion of fallacy beyond merely argument structure, to include any kind of 
dialectical move which can obstruct truth-seeking, such as irrelevant contributions or 
unhelpful repetitions. 
The sūtra text characterizes wrangling and disputation as both employing these same 
strategies, but notes that latter focuses on criticism without establishing a contrary standpoint 
(NS 1.2.3). While discussion is, early on, lionized as truth-conducive—see Vātsyāyana’s 
opening to the Nyāyasūtra, for instance—the other two forms of debate, along with their 
characteristic argumentative strategies, are reserved for defensive situations, when the truth 
must be protected: 
Disputation and wrangling have the purpose of protecting truth which has been 
apprehended, just like a covering of thorns and branches has the purpose of protecting 
 
pakṣapratipakṣaparigraho vādaḥ. NVTṬ, 270, 3-4. 
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seeds and sprouts (NS 4.2.50).5 
 However, there is tension running through early efforts to explain this defensive role. It 
seems like truth cannot genuinely be defended by appeal to fallacious reasoning. To support 
or criticize a claim requires the use of genuine epistemic instruments (pramāṇa) or auxiliaries 
such as hypothetical reasoning (tarka), but if equivocation, futile rejoinders, and points of 
defeat are fallacious, then they do not support in the sense of justify or criticize in the sense 
of undermine, but, at best, act as rhetorical distractions, which do not touch the “merits” of 
the issue at hand, to use pragma-dialectical terms.6  
By the time of Vācaspati Miśra’s Gloss, both Vātsyāyana (ca 5th C. CE) and Uddyotakara 
(ca 6th C. CE) had grappled with the sūtra’s established categories, arguing for the legitimacy 
of equivocation and the rest and explaining their relationship with the three categories of 
debate. In the 7th century CE, Dharmakīrti criticizes the early Nyāya model of debate in his 
VN—quoting from both works. Vācaspati subsequently targets Dharmakīrti in his own 
remarks on this topic. In what follows, I show likely allusions to Dharmakīrti and also 
examine the content of their arguments. It is true that Vācaspati draws on a wealth of texts 
 
5 tattvādhyavasāyasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ jalpavitaṇḍe bījaprarohasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ 
kaṇṭakaśākhāvaraṇavat. NVTṬ, 638, 8-9. 
6 Pragma-dialectical approaches to debate emphasize the situated nature of argumentation in 
their concern with pragmatics, or the rhetorical aspect of debate, coupled with attention to 
normative rationality, or dialectics. The focus on two distinct dialogical roles, the concern 
with argumentative effectiveness judged against audience response, and the concern with the 
temporally-indexed and situationally specific speech acts (as opposed to purely formal 
reconstructions of logical structures) all resonate with Nyāya, and indeed, more broadly 
Indian, theorizing about debate. See van Eemeren (2018) for an introduction. 
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and quite possibly he has more than just Dharmakīrti’s argument in his sights. My focus is 
only secondarily identification of textual connections, and primarily is understanding how 
Vācaspati’s arguments meet Dharmakīrti’s challenge. 
Dharmakīrti on the Unacceptability of Fallacies in Debate 
Dharmakīrti opens the Norms with a challenge to “cheaters” (śaṭha) who force points of 
defeat by using illegitimate statements, remarking that the purpose of his treatise is to argue 
against them.7 The bulk of his work focuses on these points of defeat: laying out his positive 
view of what they are, and then criticizing their categorization in early Nyāya. For 
Dharmakīrti, there is only one genuine sort of debate, and that is debate aiming at the truth—
he does not distinguish among the other categories like Naiyāyikas, and in fact, dismisses 
them. One of his main claims is that the debate’s proponent, who takes up a positive 
standpoint, must meet a different set of responsibilities than their opponent, who takes up a 
contrary standpoint, in order to win. Dharmakīrti’s argument against using equivocations in a 
discussion comes after his extensive treatment of these disparate responsibilities, in 
particular, after the idea that a proponent who does not genuinely justify their standpoint with 
proper reasoning may still be undefeated by their opponent, so long as that opponent fails to 
show these faults.8 (This is the point of defeat known as adoṣōdbhāvana.) 
Further, as he says he is concerned with consideration of the truth (tattvacintā), 
Dharmakīrti makes explicit why the opponent cannot win just because their proponent has 
used bad reasoning. If a proponent makes an unjustified claim—one “supported” by a 
counterfeit reason (hetvābhāsa)—and the opponent does not point this out, due to some 
 
7 nyāyavādinam api vādeṣu asadvyavasthopanyāsaiḥ śaṭhā nigṛhṇanti tanniṣedhārtham idam 
ārabhyate. All references to VN from Much (1991) 1: 2-3. 
8 For a summary, see Gokhale (1993) xiv-xxvii, translation 56-57. 
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performative or epistemic failure, then neither participant has gained a genuine 
understanding. That is, the claim at issue may or may not be true, but since no genuine 
inference is occasioned, as the argumentation lacks the requisite structure, the proponent fails 
to have knowledge. And if the opponent does not understand the faulty reasoning, they are in 
no position to know, either.  
It is at this point that the topic of equivocation arises. Dharmakīrti gives a reason for why 
the balance of responsibilities in discussion is as he’s described: “For, in consideration of the 
truth, there is no employment of equivocation.”9 Though equivocation is not mentioned 
directly in the immediate context, this is no non sequitur. Equivocation, as defined and 
exemplified in early sources, such as the NS, involves stretching an interlocutor’s words so as 
to make a reply which, while seeming convincing, misses the mark. For an opponent who 
either does not understand their interlocutor’s words or cannot find a ready reply, 
equivocation presents a strategy to avoid the point of defeat just mentioned: not pointing out 
a flaw. However, since it does not touch the merits of the case, an equivocation fails in the 
goal of considering the truth. Yet, as we have seen, early Nyāya allows for equivocations, 
along with other strategies, in certain contexts where truth is at issue. And thus Dharmakīrti 
considers the Nyāya viewpoint at some length. 
[Naiyāyika] “Despite the employment of equivocations, couldn’t this constitute 
‘discussion for those who desire victory’?” 
[Reply] No, because the use of the discipline of debate (śāstra) that belongs to virtuous 
people is for one who is eligible to dispute unvirtuous people. For, those who practice 
kindness towards others do not teach unvirtuous practices to a person who boasts about 
 
9 na hi tattvacintāyām kaścic chalavyavahāraḥ. VN, 21: 22. 
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themselves and insults others because of undertaking erroneous prattle. And acquiring 
wealth, renown, or praise through insulting others is not virtuous conduct. Neither is it 
appropriate for the one who engages in the discipline of debate, who is seated in the 
assembly among those considered good, to make living beings suffer by lending their 
own helping hand to those who behave in this way. And the treatises on reasoning are not 
used by the virtuous for the purpose of acquiring wealth, etc. Therefore, there is no such 
thing as properly employed (yogavihita) “discussion among those who desire victory.”10  
Dharmakīrti first argues that a debate which uses equivocations, because its purpose is 
victory, is not genuinely “discussion.” His response to the Naiyāyika focuses on the person 
engaging in debate, not merely their argumentative strategies. According to him, the use of 
śāstra, or the discipline of genuine debate known as vāda, is only appropriate for a person 
someone who has eligibility or authority (adhikāra) to debate unvirtuous people (durjana). 
The mention of “unvirtuous people,” suggests that, with McClintock (2010:72), Buddhist 
practitioners of debate were concerned not only with those internal to their ranks, but also 
 
10 chalavyavahāro ’pi vijigīṣuṇāṃ vāda iti cet. na durjanavipratipattyadhikāre satāṃ 
śāstrāpravṛtteḥ. na hi parānugrahapravṛttā mithyāpralāpārambhātmotkarṣaparapaṃsanādīn 
asadvyavahārān upadiśanti. na ca paravipaṃsanena lābhasatkāraślokopārjanaṃ satām 
ācāraḥ. nāpi tathāpravṛttebhyaḥ svahastadānena prāṇinām upatāpanaṃ satsam matānāṃ 
śāstrakāraśabhāsadāṃ yuktam. na ca nyāyaśāstrāṇi sadbhir lābhādyupārjanāya praṇīyante. 
tasmān na yogavihitaḥ kaścid vijigīṣuvādo nāma. VN, 22: 8-16. 
In my translation, I follow Śāntarakṣita’s commentary, which glosses yogavihita with nyāyya, 
but not his implication that Dharmakīrti is concerned with the method and not desire for 
victory: tasmān na yogavihitaḥ nyāyyaḥ kaścid vijigīṣu vādo nāma yacchalādibhiḥ kriyata ity 
adhyāharaḥ. (Vipañcitārtha 70:48b). See Gokhale (1993: 167) for discussion. 
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outsiders who oppose Buddhist truths because of deep intellectual and ethical failings. The 
focus on eligibility shifts focus from techniques, which one might construe as ethically 
neutral, to the moral nature of the person employing them. 
However, what we see is that debate practices are not merely neutral rules of order, but 
they are ethical practices, such that instructing another person in certain argumentative 
strategies constitutes engaging in unvirtuous practice (asadvyavahāra). The aim of debate for 
Dharmakīrti is helping another person, not attaining victory over them, and to teach someone 
such strategies implicitly, by displaying them yourself, is to engage in a kind of moral harm. 
As a result of taking up these practices, which are essentially “prattle” (pralāpa) as they do 
not touch the merits of the argument, the sophistical debater displays moral failings in their 
speech (insulting others) and attitudes (self-aggrandizement). This precludes them from 
eligibility in debating for the truth. 
Further, if the aim in a debate were to be victory, that would entail a goal of “acquiring 
wealth, renown, or praise” (lābhasatkāraślokopārjana). One might object that there is no 
necessary connection between desiring intellectual victory in a debate and desiring monetary 
gain, fame, or adulation. However, there are likely two reasons for this remark. First, 
Uddyotakara himself has made a connection between equivocation, futile rejoinders, and the 
desire for these material results in his Extensive Commentary (Nyāyavārttika, NV) at NS 
5.1.1. There, he notes that someone might use a futile rejoinder in response to good reasoning 
because they want wealth, honor, and fame (lābhapujākhyatikāma).11 Dharmakīrti is 
targeting Uddyotakara’s claim, even if he chooses different language. 
 
11 NV 497:12. Interestingly, Jha’s translation, perhaps seeing Dharmakīrti’s worry, inserts in 
brackets something not in the Sanskrit text: “and being anxious to guard the Truth against 
attack” (1984, Vol 4, 1661). This is how Vācaspati puts things, as we will see, but not 
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There may be a further implication, too. Dharmakīrti could be insinuating that employing 
tricky strategies robs the victory of its intellectual aspect—what is left is empty “debate,” 
which only elevates one person above another in terms of rhetorical skills. This entails that 
the underlying goal is disparagement of another along with self-elevation. And these aims, 
especially achieved through harmful speech, are antithetical to the attitude that Buddhists 
wish to inculcate. Dharmakīrti, rather than using Uddyotakara’s turn of phrase, is using a 
stock phrase found in Mahāyāna Buddhist texts such as the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā.12 
It says that attachment to these goals are obstacles to the bodhisattva path, ones that a person 
should give up: 
If the Bodhisattva approaches perfect wisdom in this way, apperceives it, enters into it, 
understands it, reflects on it, examines, investigates, and develops it, - with acts of mind 
that have abandoned all deception and deceit, all conceit, the exaltation of self, all 
laziness, the deprecation of others, the notion of self, the notion of a being, gain, honour 
and fame (lābhasatkāraśloka-), the five hindrances, envy and meanness, and all 
vacillation, - then it will not be hard for him to gain the full perfection of all virtues, of 
the Buddha-field and of the supreme dharmas of a Buddha (Conze 1973, 480).13 
 
Uddyotakara. 
12 For instance, the phrase lābhasatkāraśloka- comes up several times as examples of 
negative characteristics that bodhisattvas should give up to attain irreversible enlightenment 
(Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā 11.3, 17.1, 29, 30.1). 
13 Sanskrit: yadāyaṃ subhūte bodhisattvo mahāsattva evam enāṃ prajñāpāramitām 
anugamiṣyati, vyavacārayiṣyati avatariṣyati avabhotsyate cintayiṣyati tulayiṣyati 
upaparīkṣiṣyate bhāvayiṣyati sarvamāyāśāṭhyavivarjitair manasikāraiḥ, 
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The same attitude towards the truth characterizes the discussant, as opposed to the debater 
who desires victory. As McClintock (2010) puts it, “it is not that [Dharmakīrti] does away 
with the idea of victory (vijaya) but rather that he advocates a notion of victory as inherently 
tied to truth” (70). And as Dharmakīrti himself says, “The person who desires victory should 
establish his own standpoint and the other standpoint ought to be refuted.”14 For Dharmakīrti, 
it seems, one cannot try to win a debate with less-than-rational means without thereby 
slipping into desiring material gain and self-aggrandizement, which are obstacles to the 
Buddhist path. 
In addition to the implicit connection between the debater’s desiring victory and desiring 
morally obstructive outcomes, Dharmakīrti points out the damage this strategy would have 
for other people. If a proponent resorts to less-than-rational means, they make living beings 
suffer (prāṇinām upatāpanam), which is the direct opposite of what a Buddhist engaging in 
discussion ought to do. According to Dharmakīrti, the purpose of discussion is to assist 
 
sarvamanyanāvivarjitair manasikāraiḥ, ātmotkarṣaṇavivarjitair manasikāraiḥ, 
sarvakausīdyavivarjitair manasikāraiḥ, parapaṃsanāvivarjitair manasikāraiḥ, 
ātmasaṃjñāvivarjitair manasikāraiḥ, sattvasaṃjñāvivarjitair manasikāraiḥ, 
lābhasatkāraślokavivarjitair manasikāraiḥ, pañcanīvaraṇavivarjitair manasikāraiḥ, 
īrṣyāmātsaryavivarjitair manasikāraiḥ, sarveñjanāvivarjitair manasikāraiḥ, tadā nāsya 
durlabhā bhaviṣyati sarvaguṇānāṃ paripūriḥ, buddhakṣetrasyānuttarāṇāṃ ca 
buddhadharmāṇāṃ paripūrir iti. Sanskrit text and Conze translation both accessed through 
University of Oslo, Bibliotheca Polyglotta https://www2.hf.uio.no/, permanent link: 
ttp://www2.hf.uio.no/common/apps/permlink/permlink.php?app=polyglotta&context=record
&uid=7c0b2da4-5528-11e4-856a-001cc4ddf0f4 
14 tasmāj jigīṣatā svapakṣaś ca sthāpanīyaḥ parapakṣaś ca nirākartavyah. VN, 24:01. 
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people in coming to know the truth, for their own good. The result of a debate should be a 
determination of the truth, or, as he puts it more metaphorically in the closing of the Norms, 
“to remove the veil of blindness which is ignorance.”15 Of course for Dharmakīrti, the chief 
ignorance to remove is the belief in a self, although other related erroneous views are targets 
of Buddhist debate, too.16 Were a supposedly virtuous person, trained in the discipline of 
debate, to engage in these practices, it would be tantamount to endorsing them. This would be 
giving one’s own hand in assistance (svahastadāna) to such people, who we have already 
seen have distorted aims. Recall, too, that the purpose of the Norms is to engage with 
“cheaters” (śaṭha) who use improper debate practices. Alluding to this contrast in the closing, 
Dharmakīrti characterizes these unvirtuous yet clever people as ones who bring about 
blindness, who are responsible for drawing the veil of ignorance over the light of truth.17 
There is a sharp divide between people who use proper debate practices and enlighten the 
world and those who use tricks, blinding people from the truth. 
 
15 loke ’vidyātimirapaṭalollekhanas tattvadṛṣṭer vādanyāyaḥ… VN, 68:10. 
16 See Dunne (2013: 60-62) for a discussion of the way in which reasoning (yukti) plays a 
role in Dharmakīrti’s soteriological-philosophical project of removing ignorance, and 
Eltschinger (2010) for a more detailed study of the relationship between ignorance and 
Dharmakīrti’s soteriology. Of course, while assent to the proposition “There is a self,” is part 
of Dharmakīrti’s concern, the ignorance involved is more robust, being, as Dunne puts it, a 
“cognitive habit” in which one erroneously thinks experiences have their basis in a self that 
persists, unchanging, over time (61). Thus, ignorance leads to grasping at pleasures for the 
sake of this “I” with which one continually, mistakenly, identifies. 
17 tattvālokaṃ timirayati taṃ durvidagdho jano ’yaṃ… VN, 68:11. 
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Finally, Dharmakīrti concludes that not only does employing these strategies entail that 
one’s motives are improper—aiming at self-aggrandizement, and so on—but they are a 
misuse of the śāstra. Having concluded his rebuttal of the view, having argued that 
“discussion for those who desire victory” is a misnomer, he makes explicit the function of 
discussion: 
But those who are practicing kindness towards others, explaining their misunderstanding, 
ought to conform to reason by stating genuine supports (satsādhanābdhidānena) or by 
showing real flaws (bhūtadoṣodbhāvanena). The perception of eyewitnesses is for the 
purpose of their coming to fully understand (anuprabodhāya). That very conformity with 
reason is discussion for the virtuous. When the reasoning is stated, assuming a person is 
someone who aims at truth, that person ought to understand, too; when (the reasoning) is 
not understood, another person should not misunderstand it.18 
In other words, it is an act of compassion to give genuine arguments for one’s standpoint 
or genuine criticisms against the counter-standpoint. After all, for Dharmakīrti, the method of 
debate is to employ inference (anumāna) which conduces a person to attain knowledge—
even if there are questions about the metaphysical status of this epistemic instrument and the 
 
18 parānugrahapravṛttās tu santo vipratipannaṃ pratipādayanto nyāyam anusareyuḥ 
satsādanābhidhānena bhūtadoṣodbhāvavena vā sākṣipratyakṣaṃ tasyaivānuprabodhāya. tad 
eva nyāyānusaraṇaṃ satām vādaḥ ukte nyāye tattvārthī cet pratipadyeta tadapratipattāv apy 
anyo na pratipadyeteti. (VN 22:16-21). 
Contra McClintock (2010:70), I take the reference to the perception of eyewitnesses 
(sākṣipratyakṣa) as not “in the presence of witnesses, in order to bring just that [other person] 
to knowledge,” but as a distinct concern for the audience’s knowing, which we will see 
echoed in his language below. 
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(ultimately unreal) individuals employing it.19 Dharmakīrti makes explicit the several 
beneficiaries of such a discussion. There is the opponent, whose misunderstandings would be 
explained, and, if they are convinced, would subsequently be removed. If the opponent is not 
someone who is attached to their views (dṛṣṭirāga), unlike Sāṃkhya opponents who are so 
attached20, but is persuadable and seeking only the truth, then, these arguments would 
convince them.  
There is also the watching audience who also benefits from such a presentation, whether 
or not the opponent does. Audiences to debates would vary, depending on location 
(monasteries or courts), but typically included religious adherents—monks and priests—as 
well as political figures—kings and their advisors. Though elites and learned people, these 
audiences fluctuate in their understanding of the issues at hand as well as their attitude 
(sympathetic, neutral, or hostile), as we learn from early texts like the Cārakasaṃhitā. 
Dharmakīrti is concerned that they, too, come to an awareness of the truth. There is no 
explicit reference in Dharmakīrti’s text (nor Vācaspati’s for that matter) to varying epistemic 
standards relative to these kinds of audiences, but we might infer that different argumentative 
strategies might be employed within the constraints of making genuine inferences. One might 
select different examples to support their claims, for instance. 
The final interlocutor that Dharmakīrti takes up in this section is also Naiyāyika, who 
echoes NS 4.2.50. This sūtra states that disputation and wrangling aim to protect the 
 
19 In this paper, I am intentionally agnostic about the thorny problems of how Dharmakīrti 
understands the ultimate reality of pramāṇas, leaving the discussion at the level of the 
conventional. On this point, see, e.g., Dunne (2004), Eltschinger (2014), and Tillemans 
(1999). 
20 VN, 12:08. 
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apprehended truth (tattvādhyavasāyasaṃrakṣaṇārtham). Dharmakīrti’s reply by way of 
prasaṅga, which I’ll call “Reductio ad Violence” states what he takes to be an obvious 
absurdity :21 
[Naiyāyika] “Couldn’t it be that equivocations and the like, [used] by those who desire 
victory are only to be given by the virtuous for the aim of protecting the truth 
(tattvarakṣaṇa)?” 
[Reply] Then it should also be said that [this should happen] by scratches, slaps, slashes 
from swords, and setting them on fire! Therefore, this method [of equivocations] of 
protecting the truth is not a better approach [than the physical one].22 
We might even call this reductio reductio ad baculum, after the fallacy argumentum ad 
baculum, or “argument to the stick.” In a sense, this reductio assumes that appeal to negative 
consequences, especially violence, is a fallacy. Dharmakīrti’s charge is that allowing 
equivocation is effectively opening the door to physical violence in debate. The connection 
between violence and equivocations is implicit; however, the point seems to be that both are 
equally misapplied as methods. Suppose protecting the truth means winning a debate. 
Physical violence could force one’s opponent into an extreme version of the Nyāya point of 
defeat, inability to reiterate (ananubhāṣana), since they couldn’t reply in the first place. 
 
21 The recent discourse in the United States over “punching Nazis” and other white 
supremacists suggests that, for some, the reductio is not a reductio. See Stack (2017) and 
West (2017). But both Dharmakīrti and Vācaspati, as we will see, do not countenance 
violence even against morally reprehensible interlocutors. 
22 tattvarakṣaṇārthaṃ sadbhir upahartavyam eva chalādi vijigīṣubhir iti cet na 
nakhacapeṭaśastraprahārādīpanādhibhir apīti vaktavyam. tasmān na jyāyān ayaṃ 
tattvarakṣaṇopāyaḥ. VN, 22:23-24. 
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(Dharmakīrti does not consider this its own type of a point of defeat, but agrees that someone 
who cannot understand and remains silent is defeated.) Analogously, an undetected 
equivocation, to which an opponent has no reply, would count as protecting the truth. But 
then so would physical violence, since one’s opponent also would be unable to continue in 
debate. However, the sense of “protect” (√rakṣ) relevant to debate is that of preservation of 
the truth for soteriological aims—if one’s interlocutor is silenced through injury or death, 
they are in no position to make use of the truths of the Buddha. And the audience fails to 
come to know the truth. And, as we saw with the reference to desires for material gain above, 
such violence is obstructive to the proponent’s own moral path. Thus protecting the truth 
cannot simply mean silencing and defeating.  
On this explanation, making threats or using violence is a flawed method because they are 
inapt given the conversational aims of debate (for the truth). Perhaps threats and even actual 
violence could be prudential reasons in a negotiation, or a time of war, but not in a debate for 
the truth. This approach coheres with the aforementioned pragma-dialogical analysis of 
fallacies (van Eemeran and Grootendorst 1987). However, we might think that violent actions 
are more than merely instrumentally inappropriate, but that they are unvirtuous actions, full 
stop. Perhaps, then, Dharmakīrti is underscoring not merely the failure of violence to 
constitute a reason, but the conflict with the possibility of a virtuous person using these 
methods—violence or equivocation. This interpretation of the reductio would underscore the 
negative implications for one’s character in employing the methods. For instance, Kimball 
(2006) understands argumentum ad baculum as evidence of both “intellectual laziness and a 
certain arrogance of power” (98). 
While this analysis of the Reductio ad Violence is not implausible, and it does cohere 
with Dharmakīrti’s overall emphasis on the virtues displayed in good reasoning, I think his 
focus in this section is on the methods, given his use of the instrumental (-dīpanābhir) and 
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the fact that he does not challenge the presumption that this is an approach, or method 
(upāya) used by the virtuous. Of course, the term for method, upāya, has broad resonance in 
the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition, implying a particularly skillful, context-sensitive, approach 
to bringing about knowledge in someone. So the use of violence is not such a method in a 
debate context. Just what prevents a practice from being an upāya isn’t explicit here, though 
we may surmise that, when the aim is a deep understanding—assent to propositions as well as 
corresponding change in one’s way of experiencing “self” and the world—a non-rational 
method which inflicts suffering is far from what Buddhists would think of as useful. These 
features would characterize both violence and the use of fallacies for Dharmakīrti. 
Dharmakīrti concludes by explicitly connecting supports and flaws to the protecting of 
the truth: 
For virtuous people, putting forward a support and criticizing the pseudo-proof is the 
means to protecting the truth. This is because the truth is not established in this 
situation without these, even were there the strategy of making the other person suffer 
because of erroneous prattle. Therefore, the declaration of the truth in order to help 
others is the proponent’s victory; the prevention of erroneous understanding by 
showing real flaws is the opponent’s victory.23 
Here he sums up not only the argument in this section, but the thrust of the entire first 
portion of his Norms. There are distinct responsibilities for participants in the debate 
 
23 sādhanaprakhyāpanaṃ satāṃ tattvarakṣaṇopāyaḥ sādhanābhāsadūṣaṇaṃ ca tadabhāve 
mithyāpralāpād atra paropatāpavidhāne ’pi tattvāpratiṣṭhāpanāt. anyathāpi nyāyopavarṇane 
vidvatpratiṣṭhānāt. tasmāt parānugrahāya tattvakhyāpanaṃ vādino vijayaḥ 
bhūtadoṣadarśanena mithyāpratipattinivarttanaṃ prativādinaḥ. VN, 23:1-5. 
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depending on their role as proponent or opponent, and without genuinely supporting one’s 
own standpoint (or demonstrating real flaws in one’s opponent’s), there is no truth 
established, and thus no victory in the strictest sense. Nyāya philosophers, then, who resort to 
wrangling and disputation, insofar as these “debate” forms employ irrational strategies, are 
contributing to suffering, obscuring the truth, demonstrating their material and unspiritual 
aims, along with fundamental confusion about the purpose of debate, as they are participating 
in a performative contradiction.24 Vācaspati Miśra takes up each of these criticisms in his 
Gloss. 
Vācaspati Miśra’s Conditions for Truth-Protection by Fallacy 
In what follows, we will see that Vācaspati’s work echoes Dharmakīrti’s arguments in his 
language throughout the NVTṬ, and that he introduces the concept of “dispassionate 
discourse” (vītarāgakathā) as a way to deflect the ethical criticisms against equivocations and 
other strategies. As noted above, my focus here is Vācaspati’s philosophical reply to 
Dharmakīrti’s criticism. Thus below I point out places of resonance, which may or may not 
strictly be textual reuse. 
At NS 1.2.1, where the definition of discussion is given, Vācaspati defines it in contrast 
with disputation and wrangling: 
Discussion (vāda) is taking up a standpoint and a contrary standpoint, a taking up 
which is supported and criticized by epistemic instruments and hypothetical 
reasoning, which does not contradict settled claims, and which is obtained by the five 
 
24 Dharmakīrti includes disputation (vitaṇḍā) in his criticism: “With this very same idea, 
disputation is argued against, because there is no debate (vivāda) when there is no proposal 
(abhyupagama).” etenaiva vitaṇḍā pratyuktābhyupagamābhāve vivādābhāvāt. VN, 61:1-2. 
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parts [of an inference, anumāna].25 
The issue, identified by earlier commentators, is that disputation especially could fall 
under this definition: even when someone employs equivocation and other strategies, they 
still may use epistemic instruments and hypothetical reasoning. However, in agreement with 
Uddyotakara’s restriction, that discussion uses just (eva) the rational methods, Vācaspati adds 
that this does not mean all discussion successfully employs these methods, but that doing so 
is the goal of the discussant: “Allow that there are genuinely (paramārthato) the five parts [of 
an inference] whose basis are the epistemic instruments been assisted by hypothetical 
reasoning, or allow that it isn’t so. But don’t allow that these five members whose basis are 
the epistemic instruments are intention of the proponent and opponent (in the case of 
disputation and wrangling).”26 In other words, a discussion is characterized by an intention to 
use genuinely rational argumentative methods, even though one may err in so doing. On the 
contrary, in disputation and wrangling, there is no such intention. What Vācaspati says next 
echoes Dharmakīrti on the nature of discussion, both in form and key language: 
By doing just this much (aiming at using epistemic instruments assisted by 
hypothetical reasoning), discussion’s nature is supporting and criticizing by epistemic 
instruments and hypothetical reasoning, since its outcome is determining the truth 
(tattvanirṇayāvasānatvāt), as it is dispassionate discourse (vītarāgakathātvena). But 
disputation and wrangling have their basis in things which are not epistemic 
 
25 pramāṇatarkasādhanopālambhaḥ siddhāntāviruddhaḥ pañcāvayavopapannaḥ 
pakṣapratipakṣaparigraho vādaḥ. NVTṬ, 270: 3-4. 
26 tarkānugṛhītapramāṇamūlā avayavāḥ paramārthato bhavantu mā bhūvan, 
vādiprativādinos tv abhiprāyo bhavatu pramāṇamūlā avayavā iti. NVTṬ, 272: 8-9. 
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instruments, even when they are defended by a wise opponent (viduṣā) using 
equivocations and so on. The disputatious opponent who desires victory hopes, “Let 
there be doubt which is better than complete defeat.” And as for that person, in the 
(Nyāya) śāstra the instruction is not dissimilar, and as this is conduct belonging to the 
virtuous (satām ācāraḥ), in this manner, we will speak on the definition of 
disputation.27 
Here, Vācaspati notes he will have to take up the relationship between disputation and a 
virtuous person’s actions, since there seems to be some allowance in the Nyāyasūtra for using 
these strategies and being virtuous. Indeed, he says later, at NS 1.2.2, that using equivocation 
is not conduct of the unvirtuous (nāsadācāraḥ) because it is done for the purpose of 
protecting the truth (tattvasaṃrakṣaṇārthatvāt), as NS 4.2.50 says. These are the only two 
places where these phrases, satām ācāraḥ and nāsadācāraḥ, occur in Vācaspati, and, as far as 
I can tell, they do not appear in Vātsyāyana or Uddyotakara’s commentary. But they are 
characteristic of how Dharmakīrti speaks about the virtuous and unvirtuous debate 
participants. 
 Moreover, we see Vācaspati’s strategy for replying to Dharmakīrti, which is to 
introduce the category of “dispassionate discourse” (vītarāgakathā). That there are negative 
implications from having passion (rāga) is a view shared broadly between both Naiyāyikas 
and Buddhists. Passion is an obstacle to liberation (mokṣa) for Nyāya philosophers, as it 
 
27 etāvataiva pramāṇatarkasādhanopālambhatā vādasya vītarāgakathātvena 
tattvanirṇayāvasānatvāt. jalpavitaṇḍayos tv apramāṇamūlatvaṃ viduṣāpi prativādinā 
chalādibhiḥ pratyavastheyam, ekāntaparājayād varaṃ saṃśayo ’stv itīcchatā vijigīṣuṇā. 
yathā cāsya śāstre vyutpādanaṃ nāsadṛśaṃ yathā caiṣa satām ācāraḥ, tathā jalpalakṣaṇe 
vakṣyāmaḥ. NVTṬ 272, 9-13. 
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keeps individuals attached to things, and subsequently leads to a multitude of unvirtuous 
activities in striving towards those things, or avoiding things one has aversions toward. 
Vācaspati appreciably quotes and glosses Uddyotakara’s discussion on this point, in his 
introduction to the NS, noting that there are two kinds of people: those who are passionate 
and those who are dispassionate, and that there are likewise two kinds of actions, the 
passionate and dispassionate sort. Importantly, for Vācaspati, dispassionate people do not aim 
at visible results.28 This does not preclude acting entirely. It excludes the sort of acting 
motivated by aquiring anything other than the ultimate goal (apavarga)—which is itself 
attained by avoiding suffering and taking up means to liberation. The dispassionate person 
acts motivated by a kind of disinterest or cool impartiality, as Vācaspati says in his discussion 
of 1.1.22, “For aversion (dveṣa) is something whose nature is burning. Dispassion (vairāgya) 
is not like this. For it is the idea, ‘Enough,’ therefore it is not opposed to the removal of 
suffering.”29 What motivates a dispassionate person is avoiding suffering—what one thinks is 
 
28 “What is experienced is the cause belonging to efficacious behavior, therefore the 
efficacious behavior belonging to attachment and so on is mentioned [by Uddyotakara], but it 
is not [the cause] among those who are dispassionate, for what is experienced has no 
connection with the result that is defined as the attainment of niḥśreyasa, arising from their 
behavior, since niḥśreyasa is beyond ordinary experience.” dṛṣtam pravṛttisāmarthyaṃ hetur 
iti rāgādimatpravṛttisāmarthyam upanyastam na tu vītarāgāṇām na hi tatpravṛtter 
niḥśreyasādhigamalakṣaṇaphalasaṃbandho dṛṣṭo niḥśreyasasya alaukikatvāt. NVTṬ, 8:21-
9:2. 
29 jvalanātmako hi sa bhavati. naivaṃ vairāgyam. alaṃ pratyayo hi sa ity apratikūlaṃ 
duḥkhahānam ity arthaḥ. NVTṬ, 202:20-21. For further discussion of Vācaspati on vairāgya, 
see Chakrabarti (1983) and Framarin (2009) Here I accept Chakrabarti’s general 
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“enough” is suffering and its causes—along with removing it in others. However, these 
actions do not come about from intensely experienced aversion to suffering, like a fire. 
Rather, it is a kind of dispassionate frame of mind. 
 As for Dharmakīrti, Dunne (1996:538) observes that he uses the term “passion” 
(rāga) at least in one place to characterize the intensely compassionate actions of the Buddha 
and advanced bodhisattvas, suggesting that the negative connotation of attachment is not 
always connected to his use of the term. However, for ordinary people, passion is bound up 
with attachment, so that they erroneously superimpose concepts like “selfhood” onto the 
world. This is because, for Dharmakīrti, to be attached to objects presupposes an enduring 
self which attains those substantial objects. But, by Dharmakīrti’s lights, there is no such 
enduring self, nor is there a distinction in kind between “self” and objects which one 
possesses (Dunne 1006: 536-37). Despite this, he argues, just because people engage in 
certain activities, such as speaking, we need not characterize them as passionate in the 
negative sense. He says in the Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti (PVSV), “Nor is it possible to infer 
that someone is passionate through some particular kind (of speech that only people have); it 
is not possible because it is difficult to know what a person's intention really is.”30 After all, if 
a Buddha engages in speech, it is not because he is conceptually confused. He is capable of 
avoiding conceptual errors and merely engaging provisionally in the world, for the sake of 
suffering living beings. 
 
understanding, which Framarin calls the “standard interpretation,” that Vācaspati understands 
vairāgya as a dispassionate kind of desire, lacking phenomenologically salient grasping. But 
see Chapter Six of Framarin for an interpretation on which, for him, all desire is excluded. 
30 Translation from Dunne (1996:537). 
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 Whether he is aware of this precise discussion or not, Vācaspati’s argument 
essentially leverages Dharmakīrti’s own argument against himself. If debate is dispassionate 
discourse, then it is not characterized by the negative attachment to things like fame, wealth, 
and so on, as Dharmakīrti charges. Conversely, that someone speaks in a certain way cannot 
be evidence that someone is attached. Employing an equivocation is not an inferential mark 
of rāga. Vācaspati thus makes room for the possibility of discourse which provisionally uses 
equivocation and other strategies, for the protection of the truth, without being tainted by 
unvirtuous attitudes. Though he does not say so, this strategy is like how Dharmakīrti’s 
Buddha engages in speech that would, for ordinary people, presuppose conceptual 
confusion—and he does so for the benefit of suffering living beings. Thus Vācaspati argues, a 
person who uses equivocation and other strategies does have the requisite eligibility for 
engaging in discussion, debate for the truth. In fact, he observes, in the course of commenting 
on Uddyotakara’s response to Vasubandhu at NS 1.2.1, that eligibility (adhikāra) in a 
discussion applies to the proponent and opponent who are dispassionate (vītarāga).31 
Vācaspati also attempts to block the inference to materialist desires from the use of 
equivocations. At NS 4.2.50, the sūtra-maker has said 
Disputation and wrangling have the purpose of protecting truth which has been 
apprehended, just like a covering of thorns and branches has the purpose of protecting 
 
31“ For both proponent and the opponent who are dispassionate, there is eligibility in that 
discussion [one which lacks a judge] for ‘that purpose,” that is, for the purpose of 
investigation.” tadarthaṃ parīkṣārthaṃ tasmin vāde ’dhikāro vītarāgayor eva 
vādiprativādino. NVTṬ, 282:4-5. See translation of Uddyotakara’s commentary in Jha (1984, 
Vol 1:512-513) for full context. 
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seeds and sprouts.32 
Apparently referring to an agricultural practice of piling up debris on newly planted seeds 
to block predators, the sūtra analogizes disputation and wrangling to such a defensive action. 
Here, the seed and sprouts are those novices who do not yet have full understanding of the 
truth, but are working towards it. So they are not in a position to defend themselves from 
“predators,” or unvirtuous people who might engage argumentatively with them. As part of 
his efforts to explain what the sūtra means and defend its position, it seems that Vācaspati 
wants to take this analogy very strictly: the protection is not against just any interlocutor, but 
a dangerous, immoral (or amoral) kind of person, whose speech has the potential for real 
destruction. He says: 
And that person who, before powerful rulers who support the people, using flawed 
reasons, engages in finding fault with the Veda, the Brāhmaṇas, and the other world, 
faulting them out of lack of concern towards genuine knowledge due to their wicked 
cunning and their pride in erroneous beliefs which are repeatedly employed for their 
bad philosophy (kudarśanābhyāsāhitamitthyājñānāvalepadurvidagdhatayā), or 
faulting them out of a desire for wealth, honor or fame (lābhapūjākhyātyarthitayā)—it 
is against such a person that a discussant, not seeing a non-risky way to find genuine 
fault with them, by their desire to win having resorted to disputation and wrangling, 
that discussant attacks their opponent with disputation and wrangling, engaging in 
discourse for truth (tattvakathanam) for the purpose of protecting knowledge.33 
 
32 tattvādhyavasāyasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ jalpavitaṇḍe bījaprarohasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ 
kaṇṭakaśākhāvaraṇavat. NVTṬ, 638:8-9. 
33 yaś ca kudarśanābhyāsāhitamitthyāsvadarśanamithyājñānāvalepadurvidagdhatayā 
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Here, Vācaspati restricts the contexts in which disputation and wrangling may be 
employed, and with them, such strategies as equivocation. There are several conditions which 
must be met, having to do with the several component parts of a debate: 
1. The topic under discussion must be morally weighty. There are three interrelated 
topics given as examples. If they are being criticized (-dūṣaṇam), this allows for the 
protective strategy: the Veda, the Brāhmaṇas, and the other world (paraloka). Most 
likely, such a description would bring to mind the materialist Cārvākas, who deny the 
afterlife, even ridiculing it (dūṣaṇa can mean to find fault with as well as to 
denigrate).34 These topics are not chosen at random; they are examples of important 
ethical commitments for Nyāya philosophers: authoritative texts (Vedas and 
Brāhmaṇas) whose impact is on a world beyond this one (paraloka). While the use of 
-ādi indicates these topics are not exhaustive, it is suggestive that the examples are not 
 
sadvidyānavairāgyād vā lābhapūjākhyātyarthitayā kuhetubhir īśvarāṇāṃ janādhārāṇāṃ 
purato vedabrāhmaṇaparalokādidūṣaṇapravṛttas taṃ prati vādī samīcīnadūṣaṇam 
apratibhayāpaśyan jalpavitaṇḍe avatārya vijigīṣayā taṃ vigṛhya jalpavitaṇḍābhyāṃ 
tattvakathanaṃ karoti vidyāparipālanāya. NVTṬ, 638:15. In contrast to Dasti and Phillips 
(2017: 172) I take kudarśana-…-vidagdhatayā not as a dvaṃdva (two sorts of pride), but as a 
tatpurūṣa functioning as a suboordinate instrumental reason paired with the ablative reason 
(Tubb and Boose 2007: 207). 
34 See Halbfass (1991:293-94) for discussion of stereotyped descriptions of Cārvāka thinkers. 
Also, in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Much Ado About Religion, it is the Cārvākan Vṛddhāmbhi who says 
he will “do away with God, set aside the world-to come, demolish the validity of the 
Vedas…” (īśvaraṃ parākṣrtya paralokaṃ nirasya vedaprāmāṇyaṃ pratikṣipya) (Dezső 
2005: 154-55).   
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disputes over the number of pramāṇas or other more technical topics. It is doubtful 
that a debate over the metaphysical nature of sound between a Naiyāyika and a Bhāṭṭa 
Mīmāṃsaka would trigger the legitimate use of equivocation. 
2. The opponent must have an insensitive attitude towards reason-giving. In addition to 
engaging in criticism of core ethical commitments, the opponent Vācaspati envisions 
is morally suspect. Either they are proud and overly attached to their own reasoning or 
they are mercenary, holding a position because of the wealth, honor, or fame which 
will come to them. In the first place, the lack of epistemic humility means that they 
will not be responsive to genuine reasons, if offered by their interlocutor, as they 
would be attached to their presuppositions. Likewise on the second option, in which 
they would be attached to the material results of winning the debate. Thus giving 
legitimate rejoinders or futile ones are equally effective (or not) in convincing an 
opponent who is a “lost cause.” Here, Vācaspati uses the key term vairāgya to mean 
“indifference” in a negative sense, not the sort of dispassion which characterizes 
beneficial truth-seeking. 
3. The opponent must be using faulty reasoning in the debate. The interlocutor must be 
someone who has already been arguing with flawed reasons (kuhetubhir). Their 
argumentation must necessarily be flawed, somewhere, for Naiyāyikas who 
presuppose that there is another world and that the Vedas and Brāhmaṇas are 
authoritative: there could exist no good reasoning to argue otherwise. On the other 
hand, it is possible that this suggests that their strategies are intentionally devious (ku-
), which would be consistent with their desire for material goods due to victory. If the 
faulty reasoning is employed intentionally, then the opponent has already broken the 
norms of a debate characterized as discussion. 
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4. The audience must be susceptible to moral impact from the opponent’s win. Debates 
in India are represented in a range of sources as occurring before audiences, whether 
in courts or schools. The audience here is “before powerful rulers who support the 
people” (īśvarāṇāṃ janādhārāṇāṃ purato). In connection with the next section, in 
which Vācaspati describes the possibility of the “collapse” of a moral order 
(dharmaviplava), this suggests that his concern is the cascading effect that a loss 
would have in this context.35 It is not the discussant’s personal reputation that is at 
stake, but rather the impact of the debate on the ruler, and subsequently on the people. 
Thus another necessary condition is that the audience would have a large, negative 
impact as a result of the immoral participant’s victory. 
5. The discussant must not have an alternative argumentative strategy to fallacies. 
Another crucial condition is that the discussant acts, “seeing that he lacks the ability 
to find genuine fault with them” (samīcīnadūṣaṇam apratibhayāpaśyan). This 
mention of a non-risky way, or one which “lacks danger” (apratibhaya) suggests that 
 
35 This term also comes up several times in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Much Ado about Religion 
(Āgamaḍambara) which centers on a series of debates among religious groups in Kashmir 
during the reign of Śaṅkaravarman (883-902 CE). Here, we see that even though the 
Buddhists who are characterized as being foremost among those who engage in collapse of 
the Veda (vedaviplava), the Mīmāṃsā protagonist engages in debate with them, after 
agreeing to standards that include both avoidance of equivocations but also a particular moral 
frame of mind Dezső (2005: 65). The chronological and conceptual relationship between 
Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Vācaspati is still a matter of scholarly investigation, so not too much 
should be made of the former’s use of the term except to identify a roughly contemporary and 
analogous use. 
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if the discussant is able to engage in another strategy, they ought to do so.36 Elsewhere 
(NS 5.2.16), Vācaspati makes it clear that an inability to reiterate an opponent’s points 
(ananubhāṣaṇa), the point of defeat mentioned earlier in Dharmakīrti’s work, does 
not mean that one’s opponent is right, only that the person who fails to speak has a 
flaw. To avoid this defeat, Vācaspati allows for a less-than-ideal response. 
6. The discussant’s primary motive for using fallacies must be to protect knowledge and 
must not be to benefit themself. Finally, but not least importantly, the person who uses 
an equivocation or a rejoinder, who engages in wrangling or disputation, does so not 
out of a desire to save face, but to protect knowledge (vidyāparipālanāya). This 
coheres with the characterization of discussion as dispassionate discourse, which is 
not motivated by attachment to material goods, but a concern with compassionate 
dissemination of the truth (and conversely, the prevention of widespread error).37 
 
36 This is more explicit later, under NS 5.1.1, where Uddyotakara and Vācaspati note that if 
you do know what has gone wrong in an opponent’s argument at the time, you should state 
that, rather than using a fallacy. 
37 There is another point where Vācaspati denies that desire for material goods is the 
motivation: under NS 5.5.1. Here, however, he has to explain why Uddyotakara explicitly 
says that futile rejoinders are used by someone who desires wealth, honor, or fame. His 
solution is to appeal to the grammatical principle that “and” (ca) can express something 
which is suboordinate. Thus, he says that the word “and” is for expressing something that is 
suboordinate: “[When Uddyotakara says] ‘And one who desires wealth, honor or fame,’ the 
word ‘and’ is used to express something subordinate. It is established first that the purpose is 
the protection of the truth. This being the case, there is a further suboordinate thing 
expressed—this is the meaning.” lābhapūjākhyātikāmaś cety anvācaye cakāraḥ. prasiddhaṃ 
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In summary, then, Vācaspati puts forward a set of necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions for when disputation or wrangling—and with them strategies such as 
equivocation—may be employed. In his conditions he evinces concern with restricting the 
situations in which these strategies are allowable. He concludes this section by reiterating the 
purpose for disputation and wrangling, underscoring their importance in protecting society: 
Not allowing the moral order to collapse among the people, who follow the behavior of 
powerful rulers according to their confused ideas—this is also the purpose of disputation 
and wrangling. But it is not a visible purpose such as wealth, fame, etc., because a sage, 
who acts on behalf of others, who has the highest level of compassion, does not teach 
methods of tricking others for a visible aim.38 
Here we see Vācaspati replying to Dharmakīrti’s argument that aiming at victory entails the 
goal of acquiring wealth and other worldly benefits. Rather, turning the Buddhist concern for 
compassion on its head, he claims that the motivation is compassion for the ordinary, 
vulnerable populace who might follow a powerful ruler. Thus, Vācaspati seems to emphasize 
the socially protective role that fallacies might have, for instance, faced with threats from 
 
tāvat tattvaparipālanaṃ prayojanaṃ. tasmin saty etad apy anvācīyataity arthaḥ. NVTṬ, 
642:6-7. Thus, pace Nicholson (2010), early Nyāya does not uniformly think desire for 
victory and truth are “mutually exclusive,” and the interpretation he attributes to 11th-12th 
century Hemacandra, of primary and subsidiary goals, is present earlier in Vācaspati’s work 
(fn. 81, 91). 
38 mā bhūd īśvarāṇāṃ mativibhrameṇa taccaritam anuvartinīnāṃ prajānāṃ dharmaviplava 
iti. idam api prayojanaṃ jalpavitaṇḍayoḥ. na tu lābhakhyātyādi dṛṣṭam. na hi 
parahitapravṛttaḥ paramakāruṇiko munir dṛṣṭārthaṃ paravañcanopāyam upadiśatīti. 
NVTṬ, 639:1-4. 
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materialist Cārvākans who deny the Vedas and so on. Personal self-interest, and possibly 
even smaller individual acts of compassion, such as a white lie or misleading arguments 
made to comfort a dying relative, don’t fall within the scope of Vācaspati’s concerns.39 
Vācaspati also argues against Dharmakīrti’s Reductio ad Violence argument. This occurs 
in his commentary on NS 1.2.2 and 5.1.1. In the former instance, he explicitly denies that 
there is a negative entailment, or prasaṅga, from the use of equivocation and so on, to the use 
of physical violence: 
In whatever way, there is this use [of equivocations etc.]. Because the purpose is the 
protection of the truth by that kind [of strategy], it is not activity of the unvirtuous 
 
39 The term viplava not only appears, as mentioned earlier, in the Nyāya philosopher Jayanta 
Bhaṭṭa’s play characterizing the impact of unorthodox religious groups, but as Squarcini 
(2012: 62-63) notes, in his Nyāyamañjarī, as well as early dharmasūtras such as the 
Gautamadarmasūtra. The word suggests a range of negative consequences by unorthodox 
criticism. Solomon (1976) translates Vācaspati’s particular use strongly as “total chaos in 
Dharma” (119). Jayanta motivates what he takes to be Nyāya’s purpose, protecting the 
Vedas, by observing “For, when their confidence in the Vedas becomes shaky because their 
validity is destroyed by the bad speculation of philosophers 
(tarkikaracitakutarkaviplāvitaprāmāṇyeṣu), then how can good people care about the 
performance of the objects of the Vedas which is accomplished through spending a lot of 
money, energy and so on” (Kataoka 2006:163). The epistemological question of whether 
validity can be destroyed would take us too far afield—“undermined” might be a better 
translation here. Rather, the point is the social impact of Vedic criticism. I thank an 
anonymous reviewer for raising the question about the scope of suffering that fallacies could 
allay on Vācaspati’s view. 
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(nāsadācāraḥ). And there is no instruction about deceptions and so forth belonging to 
those engaging in the discipline of debate, and there is no entailment that what is 
described are punches and slaps, because in a battle of words, these are not entailed.40 
Here, Vācaspati responds explicitly to two charges that we have seen in the Norms. First, 
Dharmakīrti has alleged that by using equivocations, someone engaging in debate is 
essentially instructing people in how to engage in unvirtuous practices (asadvyavahārān 
upadiśanti). His reply distinguishes between the motivations of someone engaging in 
protection of truth and someone simply wishing to cheat. Essentially, if the action as a whole 
is considered, which includes the agent’s motivation, it is not an instruction for cheaters. 
Second, we have seen Dharmakīrti allege that equivocation is on a slippery slope to 
violence—and equally as (in)effective. Here and at NS 5.1.1, which introduces the twenty-
four points of defeat, Vācaspati takes up this second issue, explaining that, before enemies of 
knowledge of the truth (sadvidyāvidviṣa), in front of an audience, someone can use a futile 
rejoinder (jāti) in disputation and wrangling. This person will use such a strategy hoping to 
introduce some doubt about their opponent’s thesis, thinking to themselves, “Let there even 
be doubt or some kind of partial defeat, which is better than complete defeat.”41 He continues 
on, describing the results of this strategy: 
For by this, truth is established in the world. Otherwise, the world would engage in 
 
40 yathākathañcit prayogeṇa. tadanena prakāreṇa tattvasaṃrakṣaṇārthatvāt nāsadācāraḥ. na 
ca śāstrakārāṇāṃ chalādivyutpādanam asadṛśam, na ca khaṭacapeṭādyabhidhānaprasaṅgaḥ 
vāgyuddhe teṣām aprasaṅgād iti. NVTṬ, 284:11-14. 
41 The content of his thought, marked off by the disquotative iti, is ekāntaparājayād varaṃ 
saṃdeho ’py astu kathaṃcit paraparājayo vā. NVTṬ, 641:19. 
 
Malcolm Keating, forthcoming in International Journal of Hindu Studies, please cite final version 33 
behavior which follows along the path of untruth. And when the enemies of 
knowledge are “refuted” by scratches and slaps, etc., for ordinary people, there is no 
idea of the refutation of the bad reasoning which has been put forward by the 
[enemies of knowledge]. Therefore, because his intention is that scratches and slaps 
etc. are not to be taught by the one who engages in debate, Uddyotakara says “Or it is 
used with the purpose of refuting good reasoning.” Since its content is untruth, even 
though in reality the reasoning is not good, the criticizing (dūṣaṇa) is said to be 
“good” because it does not appear (to be bad). 
Here, again, we see the necessity that the opponent be someone who is morally bankrupt 
and that the result of such a debate, were they to win, would enable ethically dubious 
behavior. Against this background, explaining why Uddyotakara refers to such a person’s 
reasoning as “good,” Vācaspati states that it is only apparently good, but not in reality. As we 
have seen, for him an enemy of knowledge has used bad reasoning, necessarily, at some 
stage. Insofar as they are defending a false thesis, at some point their reasoning has to have 
gone awry. This is not to say that they cannot engage in correct inferences at certain stages. 
However, inference is a pramāṇa. In contrast to a deductively valid argument where a false 
conclusion could be formally guaranteed by false premises merely in virtue of the argument 
structure, the outcome of a genuine inference, as opposed to a pseudo-inference, must be 
true.42 A false conclusion indicates a faulty inference. 
 
42 Vācaspati clearly accepts this principle, as shown in his discussion at NS 1.1.1., translated 
in Dasti and Phillips (2010: 538): “A pramāṇa’s non-deviation amounts to the fact that there 
will never be a contradiction anywhere, anytime, in any other conditions, between the nature 
of the object and the mode of presentation provided by the pramāṇa.” 
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As for why violence is blocked, but equivocations are not, Vācaspati appeals to the 
watching audience, made up of ordinary people. Were the Nyāya proponent to punch or slap 
their opponent, the audience would not have an idea (dhi) that the reasoning is faulty. The 
debate would stop, and perhaps the Naiyāyika would win on the technicality of inability to 
reply. But insofar as the audience has been so far convinced of the opponent, there is a danger 
that they would follow them, for instance, in Cārvākan materialism that rejects Vedic praxis.43 
And, further, as Vācaspati states at NS 1.2.2., this is a battle of words (vāgyuddha) and unlike 
in actual battles, violence is excluded just by definition. Thus, contra Dharmakīrti’s attempted 
reductio, Vācaspati argues that violence and equivocations are not equivalent. Just because 
equivocations are allowed in some restrictive instances does not entail that violence is 
likewise allowable. The dispassionate debater, of course, would not engage in violence, but 
neither is violence even conceptually available as a strategy for protecting the truth. 
The Morality and Rationality of Fallacies as Truth-Protection 
 
Is Vācaspati’s defense of irrational argumentative strategies successful? That is, is it 
permissible—both rationally and morally—to engage in fallacious argumentation under 
certain conditions? There is an immediate objection to Vācaspati’s line of reasoning that 
equivocations can do the work of defending the truth: if a debater employs a fallacy to refute 
a claim, since that claim is not thereby refuted from a logical standpoint, any “victory” in the 
form of an audience being convinced will be short-lived, as rational reflection would uncover 
the insufficiency of that fallacy as a genuine defeater. In fact, Vācaspati raises a similar worry 
at NS 1.2.2, where he agrees with Uddyotakara (contra Vātsyāyana) that such strategies are 
 
43 And if the audience isn’t yet convinced, resorting to violence might sway them towards the 
opponent, since it would suggest they have no alternative strategy. Thanks to [redacted for 
peer review] for this suggestion. 
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ineffective in protecting the proponent’s own view. With a lively analogy, he says, 
“[Uddyotakara’s] point is that a house is not protected from robbers by even one thousand 
blind persons.”44 Admitting that these are not genuine epistemic instruments or an auxiliary, 
like hypothetical reasoning (tarka), Vācaspati says that someone might accidentally use 
fallacies in a discussion, because they are confused.45 Or, they might intentionally use them, 
and thus the kind of debate becomes disputation or wrangling.46 And, as we have seen, he 
allows that disputation and its attendant fallacies are allowable in certain circumstances. 
But Vācaspati himself admits that there is no argumentative force in fallacies—in the 
sense of epistemic force. And thus any force they have is merely rhetorical. While rhetorical 
efficacy is not precluded by Nyāya debate strictures—indeed, the rules of debate seem to 
incorporate rhetoric and epistemology (or “dialectic”) in a way that modern pragma-
dialectical approaches do—it is clearly not the only concern. As we have seen, the goal of 
dispassionate discourse (vītarāgakathā) is to engage in a conversation which is subject to 
rational norms (using epistemic instruments and their auxiliaries) and which is cooperative 
 
44 na hi sahasreṇāpy andhaiḥ pāṭaccarebhyo gṛhaṃ rakṣyata ity arthaḥ. NVTṬ 284:1-2. 
45 “First, in discussion, even if these do not have the capacity for refutation (vighāta) of the 
proposition (sādhana), still, being ignorant on the true nature of these methods, a person who 
is [as Udydotakara says] ‘carried away,’ in other words, confused (vyāmohita) by the thought, 
‘With these I will refute the proposition,’ continues [with them].” vāde tāvad yadyapi na 
sādhanavighātasamarthāni tathāpi teṣāṃ tattvam avidvān ebhir ahaṃ sādhanaṃ 
vihaniṣyāmīty anayā buddhyā apahṛtaḥ vyāmohitaḥ pravartate tasmād vāde 
bhrameṇopādānam eteṣām ity arthaḥ. NVTṬ, 284:4-6. 
46 yatra tv eṣāṃ tattvaṃ vidvān pravartate, na sa vādaḥ, kiṃ tu jalpo vitaṇḍā vety āha yatra 
caitānīti. NVTṬ 284:6-7. 
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(interlocutors agree, implicitly or explicitly, to abide by certain rules to come to a justified 
conclusion together). And it is not merely conversation with no aim: the outcome is supposed 
to be knowledge of the truth, for all parties involved. Dispassionate discourse, then, cannot 
employ fallacies—as Vācaspati notes, such strategies entail that a different conversational 
project has begun.47 
One defense of Vācaspati’s view could be to posit that such a conversational shift has 
already occurred before the dispassionate debater responds with equivocations. The opponent 
is not only using bad reasoning, which could happen innocently even in a discussion, but they 
are insensitive to reasons. The opponent has essentially “opted out” of the project of truth-
seeking, and as convincing them is impossible, all is permissible. Thus, faced with a morally 
bad outcome and having no other response, fallacies are better than silence, and are morally 
justifiable on Nyāya virtue ethics. Insofar as they can be employed without obstructive 
emotions, and for compassionate purposes, they are legitimate techniques for protecting 
innocent—and poorly educated—people. Rationally, since the project is no longer 
cooperative discussion focused on determining the truth, the virtuous debater could employ 
flawed reasons. 
However, even if the debater employing fallacies could do so virtuously—that is, not out 
of malicious intent or material aims—Vācaspati’s paternalistic concern for the audience is 
undercut by his own commitment to knowledge as an essential component in the removal of 
 
47 See Todeschini (2010) for a fuller treatment of the rational, cooperative, and goal-directed 
nature of Nyāya debate in the context of the points of defeat. More cross-cultural work like 
Todeschini’s, engaging with argumentation theory and pragmatics, not just the time-worn 
question of whether Nyāya epistemology is “deductive or inductive” in nature is a 
desideratum. 
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pain, rebirth, activity, vice, and wrong understanding (NS 1.1.1-2.). Further, knowledge is 
characterized as the kind of awareness of reality which, once attained, serves as the basis for 
successful action and which drives out erroneous conceptions. Only through the use of 
epistemic instruments can individuals come to such a state. But the audiences to the virtuous 
equivocator’s performance do not enjoy the presentation of a knowledge-conducive pramāṇa; 
rather they are treated to the presentation of a fallacy under the guise of a legitimately rational 
strategy. 
One possible reply is that Vācaspati is under no illusion that disputation or wrangling are 
knowledge-conducive, and the allowance for these methods is a concession, only suitable in a 
context where the defender is subpar in their argumentative abilities and they are faced with 
an interlocutor who is likewise impaired in their apprehension of the truth.48 Thus, on this 
reading, we must distinguish between truth-generating argumentation and truth-preserving 
argumentation, and being the latter, this exception is not in tension with Nyāya aims, set out 
at NS 1.1.1.  
However, when we take controversy (vipratipatti) into account, this objection loses force. 
By definition, controversy generates doubt, which undermines the preservation of a person’s 
awareness of the truth. Faced with opposing positions on the existence of, e.g., another world, 
an audience member will wonder, as Uddyotakara puts it, “Which one is correct, and which 
one is false?”49 Although we might wish for more nuance about when disagreement leads to 
doubt about previously ascertained truth, neither Vācaspati nor his early Nyāya predecessors 
narrow controversy to occur only among epistemic peers.50 Thus, upon hearing conflicting 
 
48 I thank an anonymous referee for raising this objection. 
49 ke ’tra samyakpratipannāḥ ke mithyeti śrotuḥ saṃśayo bhavati. NV, 91.4 
50 As Dasti (2013:627) has pointed out, this could be a useful point of future research, since 
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views, a person enters into a state of doubt, which, to remove, they must find a genuine 
reason to choose one of two opposing points of view. This is the very thing which, by 
definition, disputation and wrangling lack.  
While Vācaspati does make clear that these methods are employed for particular kinds of 
people, those who are prideful about mistaken conceptions and those who have wrong ideas, 
at the same time, and in the same discussion, he’s explicit that “Certainty about the truth does 
not necessarily occur in disputation, which is not defined as investigation through a person’s 
capacities, since it is employed for victory by someone who lacks insight, etc.”51 He adds that 
it is this very ability to result in certainty that distinguishes discussion from disputation.52 
Thus, we still have an apparent tension: controversy leads to doubt in the audience about 
morally weighty claims, disputation and wrangling do not remove doubt because they do not 
 
peer disagreement is an important part of Nyāya philosophy itself, and yet Naiyāyikas do not 
doubt all of their tenets simply because they hear opposing viewpoints. Relatedly, perhaps we 
might think there are different epistemic standards for when doubt might arise based on the 
topic under discussion, and likewise different epistemic standards for resolving that doubt. 
However I see no such context-sensitivity explicitly in early Nyāya, including Vācaspati. 
Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this question. 
51 jalpe tu puruṣaśaktiparīkṣālakṣaṇe ’pratibhādināpi parājayopapatter nāvaśyaṃ 
tattvanirṇayaḥ, NVṬṬ, 54: 9-10. The reference to the two kinds of people who are the subject 
of disputation and wrangling occurs just a bit later in this same discussion of NS 1.1.1. He 
calls them durjñānāvalepadurvidaghdha. NVṬṬ, 54: 22.   
52 “Therefore, it is settled that the discussion’s difference from disputation is its resulting in 
the truth among two viewpoints.” tasmād anyataranirṇayāvasānatvena jalpād bhedo 
vādasyeti siddham. NVṬṬ, 54: 11-12. 
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feature genuine reasons, and thus this strategy could leave the audience in a worse position 
than the debate began. 
Optimistically, the application of this method leads to an audience who forgets the 
fallacy’s structure—so as not to reproduce poor reasoning in other contexts—and remembers 
only their initial doubts about a morally odious claim. They leave the debate arena convinced, 
for the moment, of the Vedas, Brāhmaṇas, and other world. At best, they will continue to 
engage in ethical practices (ritual and otherwise), even if they lack awareness of genuine 
reasons for doing so. Vācaspati is likely counting on the efficacy of these practices 
themselves as a conduit for moving the audience members closer to their ultimate goal 
(apavarga). While they are not prepared to respond to further threats to Vedic orthopraxy, 
they are no worse than they began the debate, having been protected from the enemy of the 
truth. 
But, pessimistically, the audience may reproduce the fallacies in other contexts, leading to 
erroneous beliefs. This requires that they have some ability to abstract away from the specific 
context in which they observed the particular fallacy, and if they do, then Dharmakīrti’s point 
about Nyāya philosophers teaching unvirtuous methods regains force. Or they may later 
discover that the so-called “virtuous” practitioner of discussion was, in fact, engaging in 
argumentative sleight-of-hand. This discovery could undercut trust in the truth-seeking nature 
of the Nyāya project, and in the debater’s character, potentially leading them to dismiss them 
both. Such an outcome could undermine Vācaspati’s goal of the dissemination of the truth 
through trust in testimony coupled with other epistemic instruments. 
Finally, there is a broader objection to the structure of Vācaspati’s argument to allow 
fallacies in certain, highly specific contexts, and that is the epistemic limitations of knowing 
when the conditions obtain. For instance, the topic under discussion must be one where, if the 
debate is lost, there are morally calamitous outcomes for society. However, this presupposes 
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that one is in a position to know that their own views are morally good and one’s opponents 
are not. That human beings have limits to their epistemic abilities is a central motivation for 
thinkers like J.S. Mill who would exclude no opinions from robust public discourse.53 A 
Cārvākan could employ Vācaspati’s argument against him, insofar as, on their view, Vedic 
orthopraxy and its belief in other worlds are harmful to society. While Vācaspati accepts the 
infallibility of Vedic testimony and of its author, Īśvara, he and other Naiyāyikas accept the 
fallibility of human interpreters (they criticize the interpretations of other Vedic-affirming 
thinkers, in fact). Further, it is part of Nyāya, definitionally, that it takes up investigation 
(ānvīkṣikī) into theological topics, through use of epistemic instruments, subjected to public 
scrutiny through debate. Excluding certain topics from dispute and not others is, at least 
prima facie, in tension with this commitment to investigation. 
As well, the imputation of mercenary motivations or unresponsiveness to reasons is too 
easily accomplished. Vācaspati admits that material gain can be a secondary motive for 
someone engaging in protective argumentation for the truth—but when any form of extrinsic 
benefit is in play, it could be a basis for dismissing an opponent’s intentions. Likewise, an 
opponent’s failure to be convinced by one’s own arguments could be characterized as a 
matter of pride rather than genuine, rationally-motivated disagreement. Finally, in a debate 
where both participants believe their opponent to be morally dangerous, unresponsive to 
reasons, etc., it could be advantageous for both to opt out of the norms of discussion, 
deceptively, when they have no quick reply. As a result, the cooperative and rational aspect of 
 
53 Mill in fact takes up the question of “belief in God and in a future state,” arguing that even 
if one were to think such views are immoral and impious, dangerous to society, someone who 
doesn’t allow full hearing to them “assumes infallibility” (2002: 25). 
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discussion would become fragile. Likewise, its goal-directed nature, as the turn to victory 
rather than truth becomes easily available. 
Vācaspati’s defense of this strategy seems intended to make it an exceptional one, not to 
be employed except in the most dangerous of debates. He adroitly responds to Dharmakīrti’s 
charges that it entails crass materialism and an unvirtuous, even implicitly violent method, 
characterizing it as a kind of dispassionately compassionate method to protect ordinary 
audience members who might otherwise be harmed by immorality. However, in the end, 
Dharmakīrti’s charge—that such a method is unvirtuous and actually obscures the truth—
seems to have real force, even on Vācaspati’s own commitments. 
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